Case Western Reserve Journal of
International Law
Volume 50

Issue 1

Article 17

2018

If It Looks Like a Duck: Reining in Private-Military Contractor
Conduct Through the Amended UCMJ
Michael Anderson

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarlycommons.law.case.edu/jil
Part of the International Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Michael Anderson, If It Looks Like a Duck: Reining in Private-Military Contractor Conduct Through the
Amended UCMJ, 50 Case W. Res. J. Int'l L. 307 (2018)
Available at: https://scholarlycommons.law.case.edu/jil/vol50/iss1/17

This Note is brought to you for free and open access by the Student Journals at Case Western Reserve University
School of Law Scholarly Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Case Western Reserve Journal of
International Law by an authorized administrator of Case Western Reserve University School of Law Scholarly
Commons.

Case Western Reserve Journal of International Law 50 (2018)

If it Looks Like a Duck: Reining
in Private-Military Contractor
Conduct Through the Amended
UCMJ
Michael Anderson
This Note will explore the 2007 Amendment to the Uniform
Code of Military Justice, which I contend allows the military to
exercise legal jurisdiction over a narrow-field of private-military
contractors who act as de facto soldiers. I will first explain the
historical roots of the military justice system and how it rose as
a means of ensuring discipline within military ranks. From
there I will explore the Constitutional framework of the military
justice system, including where military justice springs from and
how the military and civilian justice systems differ. I will
ultimately conclude that those subject to military law are
afforded Constitutional rights differently than those in the
civilian justice system, and that there are narrow exceptions
where extension of military justice over civilians is
Constitutionally permitted. Next, I will discuss why alternatives
to military jurisdiction of PMCs have failed and why this failure
is an important issue. After this, I will examine relevant case
law and conclude that PMCs are distinguishable from civilians
who have been exempt from military jurisdiction. Namely, I will
conclude that PMCs are more “soldier” than “civilian” and
should thus fall under the military’s jurisdiction when they
engage in criminal conduct. Ultimately, I will conclude that
because a lack of PMC discipline can harm military objectives,
PMCs act as de facto soldiers, and existing alternatives have
failed to offer adequate oversight, the extension of military law
over PMCs is Constitutionally permissible and should be not be
revoked. Accordingly, the 2007 Amendment should be upheld if
applied to a PMC.



J.D. Candidate, May 2018, Case Western Reserve University School of
Law; A.B., Politics and Government, and History, Ripon College, May
2015.
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I.

Introduction

The legal system under which military personnel live and work
has long been perceived to be markedly different from the civilian
legal system.1 Since 1950, active service-members in the United States
military have fallen under the jurisdiction of the Uniform Code of
Military Justice (“UCMJ”).2 The UCMJ, which is promulgated by
Congress pursuant to Constitutional authority, serves as the legal
authority for the military and defines criminal conduct.3 For example,
1.

Major John W. Brooker, Improving Uniform Code of Military Justice,
222 MIL. L. REV. 1, 35 (2014).

2.

Brigadier General Jack L. Rives & Colonel Bradley P. Grant, Explaining
the UCMJ, 27 Rep. 15, 16 (2000).

3.

10 U.S.C. § 801-946 (2016) [hereinafter UCMJ].
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one of the most notable differences between civilian courts, or Article
III courts,4 and courts-martials convened pursuant to the UCMJ, is
the latter’s failure to provide the protections guaranteed by the Fifth
and Sixth Amendment of the Constitution.5
In 2007, despite the apparent differences between the military and
civilian justice system, Congress, as part of the John Warner
National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2007,6 made a
seemingly innocuous amendment to the provisions of Article 2(a)(10)
(“2007 Amendment”) of the UCMJ. Article 2(a)(10) previously stated
that civilians “serving with or accompanying an armed force in the
field . . in times of war” were subject to the provisions of the UCMJ.7
The 2007 Amendment altered this provision to read “in time of
declared war or a contingency operation.”8 Contemporary courts had
interpreted the phrase “in times of war” to mean only a
Congressionally declared war.9 However, there has not been a
Congressional declared war in over fifty years,10 rendering Article
4.

An Article III court is a court created pursuant to Article III of the
Constitution. These include federal district courts, state courts,
appellate courts, and the United States Supreme Court. In other words,
Article III courts are where United States civilians are tried.
Throughout this Note, Article III and civilian justice system will be used
interchangeably.

5.

Cara-Ann M. Hamaguchi, Between War and Peace: Exploring the
Constitutionality of Subjecting Private Civilian Contractors to the
Uniform Code of Military Justice During “Contingency Operations”, 86
N.C.L. REV. 1047, 1055-56 (2008).

6.

Kara M. Sacilotto, Jumping the (Un)Constitutional Gun?:
Constitutional Questions in the Application of the UCMJ to
Contractors, 37 PUB. CONT. L.J. 179, 180 (2008).

7.

Court-martial Jurisdiction under Amended Article 2(a)(10), UCMJ,
http://www.ucmjdefense.com/resources/army-jag-school-criminal-lawdeskbook-volume/military-justice-system-overview/court-martialjurisdiction.html (last visited Mar. 26, 2018) [https://perma.cc/6PCNNMGL].

8.

UCMJ, supra note 3, § 802 (“(a) The following persons are subject to
this chapter [10 USCS §§ 801 et seq.] . . . (10) In time of declared war
or a contingency operation, persons serving with or accompanying an
armed force in the field”). Under the statute, a contingency operation is
defined as: “a military operation that – A) is designated by the
Secretary of Defense as an operation in which members of the armed
forces are or may become involved in military actions, operations, or
hostilities against an enemy of the United States or against opposing
military force; or B) results in the call or order to, or retention on,
active duty of members of the uniformed services . . . or any other
provision of law during a war or during a national emergency declared
by the President or Congress.”) (emphasis added).

9.

See e.g. United States v. Averette, 19 C.M.R. 363 (1970).

10.

Sacilotto, supra note 6, at 180.
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2(a)(10) largely unusable in its previous iteration. As such, the 2007
Amendment may re-institute the application of military justice to
civilian contractors accompanying military forces, potentially closing a
legal-loophole that has existed for decades.11
The changes in the language of Article 2(a)(10) were largely a
response to public outcry following a massive shooting during the Iraq
War resulting in the deaths of seventeen Iraqi civilians.12 In the midst
of the Iraq War, a car approaching a police checkpoint in busy Nisour
Square drew the attention of a small cadre of armed men.13 When the
vehicle failed to yield, the group began to indiscriminately fire their
weapons in the packed square.14 By the time the dust settled and the
fracas had abated, the shooting had resulted in nearly fifty casualties,
including the seventeen Iraqi civilians.15 The perpetrators of this
attack, however, were not active military personnel.16 Rather the
armed men were employed by Blackwater USA and contracted by the
United States government to assist military personnel in Iraq.17 This
massacre, termed by some as Baghdad’s “Bloody Sunday”,18 revealed
to the greater public a “dirty” secret of the United States military:
civilian contractors are frequently utilized as like replacements for
actual military personnel in modern contingency operations.
Blowback from the Nisour Square massacre was immediate, with
the military investigation conducted post-shooting noting that there
was no evidence of “enemy activity” and characterizing the

11.

Ingrid L. Price, Criminal Liability of Civilian Contractors in Iraq and
Afghanistan, 49 STAN. J INT’L L. 491, 492-493 (2013).

12.

Katherine Chapman, The Untouchables: Private Military Contractors’
Criminal Accountability Under the UCMJ, 63 VAND. L. REV. 1047, 1048
(2010).

13.

Blackwater Incident: What happened, BBC NEWS: AMERICAS,
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/7033332.stm (last updated Dec. 8, 2008)
[https://perma.cc/NA6K-XEBR].

14.

James Glanz and Alissa J. Rubin, From Errand to Fatal Shot to Hail of
Fire to 17 Deaths, NY TIMES (Oct. 3, 2007), http://www.nytimes.com/
2007/10/03/world/middleeast/03firefight.html [https://perma.cc/2M7Z3S8U].

15.

Wesley Bruer & Michael Pearson, Ex-Blackwater contractors sentenced
in Nusoor Square shooting in Iraq, CNN, http://www.cnn.com/
2015/04/13/us/blackwater-contractors-iraq-sentencing (last updated
Apr. 14, 2015) [https://perma.cc/SR8W-VCCC].

16.

Ed Pilkington, Blackwater and its Soldiers of Misfortune, THE
GUARDIAN (Jan. 1, 2010) https://www.theguardian.com/world/
2010/jan/01/blackwater-xe-history [https://perma.cc/XYJ6-XACE].

17.

Id.

18.

Jeremy Scahill, BLACKWATER: THE RISE
POWERFUL MERCENARY ARMY 2 (2007).
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Blackwater employee’s actions as “criminal.”19 Iraqi civilians who
witnessed the shooting described the event by saying “it was horror . .
. Anything that moved in Nusoor [sic] Square was shot. Women,
children, young people, they shot everyone.”20 While the perpetrators
of the Nisour Square were eventually indicted for their actions,21 a
lengthy delay preceded legal proceedings, belying the difficulties in
holding civilian contractors serving overseas accountable for criminal
conduct.22
Although events like the Nisour Square shooting and atrocities
committed by American contractors at Abu Gharib23 brought the
United States reliance on military contractors to the general public’s
conscience, such reliance on civilian contractors is hardly a modern
development.24 Historically, the military has frequently used civilian
forces to augment its strength.25 For example, General Washington
hired numerous civilians for logistical support and to haul equipment
for the Continental Army,26 while civilians accompanied General
Sherman as his forces burned their way across the Confederate States
during the Civil War.27 Recent trends suggest that the use of civilian
contractors is poised to continue and perhaps even become more
prevalent, as some estimates placed the ratio of soldiers to civilians
serving during the Iraq War at 1:1.28 Other sources proffered that
19.

Chapman, supra note 12, at 1048.

20.

Bruer, supra note 15.

21.

Finally, A Verdict on Blackwater’s Nisour Square Shooters, THE NATION
(Oct. 29, 2014), https://www.thenation.com/article/finally-verdictblackwaters-nisour-square-shooters/ [https://perma.cc/B97Z-GG99].

22.

Bruer, supra note 15.

23.

Abu Ghraib was an American prison in Iraq used to house detainees
captured by American forces. After a series of graphic photos emerged
that showed detainees being subjected numerous abuses, the
Department of Justice commenced investigations into the prison. Iraq
Prison Abuse Scandal Fast Facts, CNN, http://www.cnn.com/2013/
10/30/world/meast/iraq-prison-abuse-scandal-fast-facts/ (last updated
Mar. 18, 2018) [https://perma.cc/4AUK-VDM5].

24.

Marc Lindemann, Civilian Contractors under Military Law, 37 U.S.
ARMY WAR C. Q. PARAMETERS, 83, 84 (2007).

25.

Id.

26.

David Snyder, Civilian Military Contractors on Trial: The Case for
Upholding the Amended Exceptional Jurisdiction Clause of the Uniform
Code of Military Justice, 44 TEX. INT’L. L. J. 65, 69 (2008).

27.

William C. Peters, On Law, Wars, and Mercenaries: The Case for
Courts-Martial Jurisdiction Over Civilian Contractor Misconduct in
Iraq, 2 BYU L. REV. 367, 377 (2006).

28.

CARLOS ORTIZ, PRIVATE ARMED FORCES
GUIDE TO THE ISSUES 28 (2010).
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civilian contractors actually outnumbered military personnel in Iraq.29
This ratio has continued to grow in recent years and by some
estimates, in 2013, contractors outnumbered American military
personnel in Afghanistan by a near 2:1 ratio.30 In contrast, during
World War II, this ratio was greatly skewed towards soldiers, with
nearly seven soldiers for every civilian contractor accompanying the
military.31
While the use of civilians as supplemental forces is not a recent
development, the manner in which civilians have been utilized and
deployed has drastically changed since the times of Washington and
Sherman.32 The events of Nisour Square, perpetrated by the
employees of Blackwater USA, is emblematic of the evolving role of a
civilian contractor, and highlights the rise of private-military
contractors (“PMCs”)33 as an increasingly vital component of
American military strength.34 Although the term PMC, as typically
used, can cover a host of contractors, from those merely involved in
logistical support to those involved in direct combat,35 of chief concern
to this Note is the trend towards employing PMCs who act as de
facto soldiers by engaging in conduct typically thought as a “soldiers”
role. For example, these PMCs often engage in front-line combat
operations,36 dress like soldiers, bear military-weaponry,37 and provide
security on military bases and installations.38
29.

Michael Hurst, After Blackwater: A Mission-Focused Jurisdictional
Regime for Private Military Contractors During Contingency
Operations, 76 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1308, 1310 (2008).

30.

See Price, supra note 11, at 493 (noting that in 2013, nearly 110,00
Department of Defense contractors were present in Afghanistan, while
American military personal numbered only 66,000. Perhaps
unsurprisingly, the article further points out that in 2012, contractor
deaths had actually eclipsed those of service-members.).

31.

Ortiz, supra note 28.

32.

See Peters, supra note 27, at 377-84 (discussing the development of
civilian contractors throughout American martial history).

33.

Although the acronym PMC encompasses many different types of
civilian contractors, most of whom do not engage in military actions, for
purposes of simplicity, this Note will use PMC to mean those civilian
contractors who fill a “quasi-military” role only. For a more extensive
and nuanced discussion of the broad spectrum of PMCs, see generally
PETER WARREN SINGER, CORPORATE WARRIORS: THE RISE OF THE
PRIVATIZED MILITARY INDUSTRY (2003).

34.

Sacilotto, supra note 6, at 182, quoting U.S. Dep’t Of Def., Quadrennial
Defense Review Report 75, 81 (2006) (“The Department’s Total Force-its active and reserve military components, its civil servants, and its
contractors--constitutes its warfighting capability and capacity.”).

35.

See generally Singer, supra note 33 (noting that contractors carried out
military and non-military functions).

36.

Chapman, supra note 12, at 1049.
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Part and parcel to the increasing integration of PMCs and actual
military personnel is the need to regulate PMC’s behavior and
conduct in the field through a system of legal oversight. As indicated
by the 2007 Amendment, one such attempt to ensure legal
accountability of PMCs is by placing them under the jurisdiction of
the UCMJ.39 The use of military justice to check the behavior of
civilians is not a novel concept and the 2007 Amendment to the
UCMJ reflects a long-standing principle that “civilians serving
alongside the military may be subject to courts-martial under the
military justice system in some limited capacity.”40
Determining how to best hold PMCs legally accountable when
they accompany military forces overseas is no mere triviality. Firstly,
holding PMCs criminally accountable is necessary for ensuring that
victims of PMC criminal conduct receive personal justice.41 Secondly,
legal accountability is necessary for pragmatic reasons, namely the
achievement of military objectives. Particularly in contingency
operations such as Iraq, in which military personnel are deeply
ingrained with local civilian populations, it is necessary to foster
amicable relationships with domestic populations to achieve military
objectives.42 However, local populations often do not recognize or
differentiate military personnel from PMCs, which can hamper
American military efforts when PMCs engage in criminal conduct and
are not held accountable.43

37.

Id. at 1049.

38.

Martha Minow, Outsourcing Power: Privatizing Military Efforts and the
Risks to Accountability, Professionalism, and Democracy, in
GOVERNMENT BY CONTRACT: OUTSOURCING AND AMERICAN DEMOCRACY
112 (Jody Freeman & Martha Minow eds., 2009).

39.

Chapman, supra note 12, at 1052-53.

40.

United States v. Ali, 71 M.J. 256, 262 (C.A.A.F. 2012).

41.

See Steven Paul Cullen, Out of Reach: Improving the System to Deter
and Address Criminal Acts Committed By Contractor Employees
Accompanying Armed Forces Overseas, 38 PUB. CONT. L.J. 509, 511
(noting that the absence of actual legal oversight of PMCs prior to the
2007 left victims of PMC unable to seek redress for their injuries or
grievances).

42.

Chapman, supra note 12, at 1052.

43.

Snyder, supra note 26, at 97. See also JENNIFER K. ELSEA, MOSHE
SCHWARTZ, & KENNON H. NAKAMURA, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL
32419, PRIVATE SECURITY CONTRACTORS IN IRAQ: BACKGROUND, LEGAL
STATUS, AND OTHER ISSUES, 38 (2008) (“News reports from Iraq indicate
that [private security forces] may have led in some cases to a disregard
of the sensitivities of and consequences for the Iraqi public. For a U.S.
commander in Iraq whose mission may well include winning “hearts and
minds,” such a disregard is problematic, some analysts argue.”).
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Although the application of the UCMJ to PMCs is likely the most
pragmatic option available for ensuring legal accountability of PMCs,
the practice of such application undoubtedly raises Constitutional
concerns. Namely, the amendment raises the issue of when it is
permissible to subject a civilian to the legal oversight of the military,
thus potentially depriving them of Constitutionally guaranteed rights
required in Article III courts.44
Despite the importance of the Constitutional questions raised by
military oversight of civilians, the topic has continued to remain
ambiguous in contemporary times. Even George W. Bush, an ardent
supporter of increased reliance on PMCs during his administration,
had little idea about what legal restrictions were placed on PMCs.45
This Note, however, argues that subjecting PMCs to the military
justice system is not only Constitutional, but is a superior choice to
existing alternatives in regulating PMC conduct. Thus, any attempts
to repeal or replace the 2007 Amendment to the UCMJ are
unadvised.
In Part II, this Note will discuss the rationale giving rise to a
system of military justice separate from the civilian legal system and
discusses the differences and similarities between the two systems.
Part III of this Note will examine the Constitutional framework under
which the military justice system was created, and how courts have
approached the application of military justice to civilians under this
framework. Ultimately, Part III will conclude military jurisdiction
over civilians is only permissible when: (1) the application of military
justice is a last-resort and; (2) the person to be subjected to military
jurisdiction is one whom could reasonably be determined to fall within
the purveyor of land and naval forces of the United States.
Next, Part IV will consider the alternatives to subjecting PMCs
to military jurisdiction, primarily focusing on extending United States
domestic law via the Military Extraterritorial Jurisdiction Act
(“MEJA”). Part IV will ultimately conclude that MEJA and other
alternatives would prove ineffective in adjudicating PMC conduct.
Part V will then discuss the contemporary use of PMCs as quasimilitary forces. This section will conclude that contemporary PMCs
do not fall within the gambit of civilians that have historically been
exempted from courts-martial proceedings, and instead are more
similar to the land and naval forces of the United States, thus
permitting the military to exercise jurisdiction over them. Lastly, in

44.

Peter W. Singer, Frequently Asked Questions on the UCMJ Change and
Its Applicability to Private Military Contractors, BROOKINGS, (Friday,
Jan. 12, 2007), https://www.brookings.edu/opinions/frequently-askedquestions-on-the-ucmj-change-and-its-applicability-to-private-militarycontractors/ [https://perma.cc/BK9P-UMKN].

45.

Minow, supra note 38, at 110.
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Part VI, this Note will ultimately conclude that the 2007 Amendment
is Constitutional and should be upheld, and further, that PMC
permissibly fall within military jurisdiction under the 2007
Amendment.

II. Purposes of the Military Justice System: Do
Military Justice and Civilian Justice Comport?
A.

Underlying Rationale of the Military Justice System

The military justice system has frequently been described as a
system separate and apart from the civilian justice system,46 with the
practice of separating the military and civilian justice systems
stretching back to the earliest days of the United States.47 In fact, the
existence of a separate system of military justice predates the
founding of the United States, as the Articles of War, which governed
military justice for nearly two centuries in the United States, were
first promulgated in 1775.48 The Articles of War, largely derived from
both Roman and British legal traditions, served as the statutory basis
for military justice for 175 years until the codification of the UCMJ in
1950.49 In spite of the long history of the use of a separate military
justice system in the United States the continued use of such a system
raises important questions. More specifically: what are the underlying
rationales giving rise to a military justice system separate?
It has long been assumed that the overriding purpose of the
military justice system was to enforce discipline and order throughout
military ranks.50 This assumption has its roots in the belief that the
civilian legal system is ill-suited for the unique problems faced by the
military.51 First and foremost, the military justice system developed to
enforce the “law of obedience”, as “[m]ilitary justice provides a
stimulus to cultivate such habits [instantaneous obedience] by posing

46.

David A. Schlueter, The Military Justice Conundrum: Justice or
Discipline?, 215 MIL. L. REV., 1, 5 (2013).

47.

Rives, supra note 2, at 16.

48.

Kevin J. Barry, A Face Lift (and Much More) for an Aging Beauty:
The Cox Commission Recommendations to Rejuvenate the Uniform
Code of Military Justice, 2002 L. REV. M.S.U.-D.C.L. 57, 60 (2002).

49.

Id. at 58.

50.

Schlueter, supra note 46, at 6.

51.

Lieutenant Colonel James B. Roan & Captain Cynthia Buxton, The
American Military Justice System in the New Millennium, 52 A.F. L.
Rev. 185, 189-90 (2002) ((“An army is not a deliberative body. It is the
executive arm. Its law is that of obedience. No question can be left open
as to the right to command in the officer, or the duty of obedience in
the soldier.”) (quoting Orloffv. Willoughby, 345 U.S. 83, 94 (1890))).
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the threat that disobedience of commands will be penalized.”52 The
concept of discipline is of the utmost importance in the military, for
“discipline is the soul of an army. It makes small numbers formidable;
procures success to the weak.”53 In light of this the military system
largely developed as means to criminalize actions, such as desertion,
which had no analogues in the civilian justice system, and further,
would be detrimental to military structure and objectives if left
unchecked.54
At the center of the military justice system sits a commanding
officer imbued with an impressively broad scope of authority.55 Prior
to convening a court-martial, the commanding officer conducts an
investigation, with advice from a judge-advocate general, into the
alleged events, and can ultimately decide to punish an offending
service member in a multitude of ways.56 If a commanding officer
believes that an accused conduct is sufficiently criminal, then he may
institute further investigation into whether a general court-martial,
the military analogue to a civilian trial for felony offenses, is
warranted.57
To many observers, from the earliest days of the Articles of War
through contemporary times, the fundamental nature of the military
justice system developed merely as a tool of commanding officers to
discipline their soldiers.58 For many who subscribe to this view, the
incessant demand on promoting discipline and order meant that the
principles of law and justice were largely relegated to a secondary
concern. As a result, commanders were given near unfettered

52.

See id. at 189 (quoting Robinson O. Everett, Military Justice in the
Armed Forces of the United States, THE TELEGRAPH PRESS (1956)).

53.

General George Washington, Instructions to Company Captains (29
July 1757), available at https://founders.archives.gov/documents/
Washington/02-04-02-0223 [https://perma.cc/8GBN-VHRN].

54.

Roan, supra note 51, at 190.

55.

Schlueter, supra note 46, at 8-9.

56.

Id. at 9 (noting that a commander can issue four different rulings
following the initial investigation: 1) a commander could decide that a
simple reprimand or individual counseling would suffice; 2) a
commander could decide that the offense was serious enough to warrant
discharge of the soldier and begin administrative proceedings; 3) a
commander, who decides on his own accord that the offender’s conduct
was merely “minor” may decide to impose nonjudicial punishment.
However, the service member is free to demand a court-martial in such
a scenario, and; 4) a commander determines that the offense is
sufficiently serious, he may begin to initiate court-martial proceedings
against the offending party).

57.

Id.

58.

Barry, supra note 48, at 58.
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authority in carrying out legal proceedings.59 However, such a
draconian system of adjudication has often led to calls for the military
system to reform and fall more in-line with the legal standards of the
civilian justice system.60
While still affording commanding officers a tool to enforce
discipline within their ranks,61 in many facets, the military justice
system has gradually begun to place more emphasis on the legal rights
of the individuals under its jurisdiction.62 In fact, as noted by some
scholars, the Manual for Courts-Martial,63 which articulates the
procedural requirements and due process rights in courts-martial
proceedings under the UCMJ, states that “justice” is a primary
purpose of military law, listing justice before discipline.64 Apart from
this language, developments in the past half-century reflect the
growing emphasis on the theme of justice, as individuals under
military jurisdiction have begun to receive many of the same rights of
law found in Article III courts.65 For example, defendants in a courtmartial proceeding are protected from self-incrimination and cruel and
unusual punishment, just as civilians are in Article III proceedings.66
Despite recent developments, which have greatly increased the
due process rights of those accused of crimes in the military justice
system, it cannot be forgotten that the desire to enforce discipline is
largely the bedrock of military justice.67 To that end, some have
59.

Id. at 63-64 (quoting General Samuel T. Ansell, Military Justice, 5
CORNELL L.Q. 1, 5 (1919)) (“I have gratifying evidence of support not
only from the public generally but from the profession - that the
existing system of Military Justice is un-American. . . that it is a system
arising out of and regulated by the mere power of Military Command
rather than Law.”) (emphasis added).

60.

David A. Schlueter, American Military Justice: Responding to the Siren
Calls for Reform, 73 A.F. L. REV. 193, 195 (noting that the military
justice system has frequently faced calls for reform after major conflicts
such as: World War I, World War II, and the Vietnam War).

61.

See generally Schlueter, supra note 46.

62.

Schlueter, supra note 60, at 196-197 (noting that the UCMJ was heavily
amended in the 1980’s to bring the military justice system in closer
accordance with the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure and
Evidence).

63.

MANUAL FOR COURTS-MARTIAL UNITED STATES, pt. II, chp. II, r. 101
(2012) [hereinafter MCM] (acting as the military equivalent of the
Federal Rules of Civil or Criminal Procedures by proscribing the
appropriate procedural requirements in a court-martial proceeding).

64.

Schlueter, supra note 46, at 6 (quoting MCM).

65.

Peters, supra note 27, at 409.

66.

Snyder, supra note 26, at 91.

67.

See generally Major Christopher W. Behan, Don’t Tug on Superman’s
Cape: In Defense of Convening Authority Selection and Appointment of
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suggested that the concepts of discipline and justice should not be
thought of as dichotomous themes, but rather, the two themes should
be considered as complementary concepts to be balanced with each
other.68 That is, the role of the commander is still given ample
deference during courts-martial proceedings. However, the extent of a
commander’s power has been somewhat tempered by the adoption of
numerous procedural protections, such as the adoption of procedural
practices that closely emulate the Federal Rules of Evidence and
Criminal Procedure.69 Thus, while the military justice system remains
first and foremost a tool for ensuring discipline, modern developments
have ensured that defendants in the military justice system are
afforded much more legal protection during courts-martial
proceedings, a reflection of the growing emphasis of justice under the
UCMJ.70
B.

Similarities and Differences Between the Two Legal Systems

As befitting the creation of a separate legal systems, there are
fairly significant differences in the procedural requirements afforded to
defendants in the civilian and military justice systems. This Note will
elect to highlight to two major differences between the military justice
and civilian justice systems that potentially could create
Constitutional concerns: the use of grand-juries and juries in the
respective systems.71
1.

Lack of Grand-Jury Requirement

In the civilian justice system, a criminal defendant’s right to a
grand-jury is enshrined in the Fifth Amendment.72 Under the Fifth
Court-Martial Panel Members, 176 MIL. L REV. 190 (2003) (“By far the
greatest influence on the modern court-martial, however, came from two
different systems, the Court of Chivalry in England and the military
code of Sweden’s King Gustavus Adolphus. These courts both struck a
balance between the demands of good order and discipline and concepts
of due process, thereby laying a foundation for modern systems of
military justice that strive to do the same.”).
68.

Schlueter, supra note 46, at 28-29 (quoting Captain John S. Cooke, The
United States Court of Military Appeals, 1975-1977: Judicializing the Military
Justice System, 76 MIL L. REV. 43, 52 (1977) (“The precept [of the
relationship of justice and discipline] has generally been reflected in the
tendency of the court to distinguish and separate functions exercised by
the commander and other line personnel . . . This tendency deserves close
scrutiny, for it must be recognized that justice and discipline are properly but two
sides of the same coin; to the extent that the court separates them unnecessarily,
it risks devaluing the whole system.”) (emphasis added)).

69.

Schlueter, supra note 60, at 195-96.

70.

Schlueter, supra note 60, at 196-98.

71.

Sacilotto, supra note 6, at 207.

72.

U.S. CONST. amend. V.
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Amendment, however, the requirement of a grand-jury is explicitly
omitted in cases arising in the military.73 The explicit decision to
exclude the grand-jury requirement from the military justice system
indicates that the Founders certainly envisioned that the military
justice system could (and should) operate under a different set of
procedural rules than its civilian counterpart. This is not to say,
however, that the military justice system does not provide a
mechanism that functions as the equivalent of a grand-jury. Instead,
a court-martial proceeding utilizes a mechanism known as an Article
32 hearing.74
Some claim that an Article 32 hearing may provide more
protections and rights than a grand-jury does.75 The Manual for
Courts-Martial provides that:
Except as provided in subsection (k) of this rule, no charge or
specification may be referred to a general court-martial for trial
until a thorough and impartial investigation of all the matters
set forth therein has been made in substantial compliance with
this rule.76

Moreover, an Article 32 hearing allows for the accused: to be
present, to have counsel accompany him, to cross-examine adverse
witnesses and review government evidence, and to present his own
evidence and witnesses.77 These safeguards are noticeably absent in a
grand-jury in a federal proceeding in the United States.78
2.

Lack of a Jury of Peers

A second noteworthy difference between the civilian legal system
and its military counterpart is the absence of the jury trial in a
military trial, or court-martial.79 The right to a jury trial is explicitly
granted by the Constitution; in fact, as the United States Supreme
Court has noted, the right to a jury is considered so important a
safeguard to individual liberty that it appears in two different parts of
73.

Id. (“No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise
infamous crime, unless on a presentment or indictment of a grand jury,
except in cases arising in the land or naval forces, or in the militia,
when in actual service in time of war or public danger.”) (emphasis
added).

74.

Adam R. Pearlman, Applying the UCMJ to Contractors in Contingency
Operations, 6 AM. U. NAT’L SEC. L. BRIEF 1, 8 (2016).

75.

Id. at 9; see also Peters, supra note 27, at 409.

76.

MCM, supra note 63, at pt. II, chp. IV, r. 405(a) (emphasis added).

77.

Id. at pt. II, chp. IV, r. 405(b).

78.

Pearlman, supra note 74, at 9; see also Sacilotto, supra note 6, at 207.

79.

Hamaguchi, supra note 5, at 1055.
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the Constitution.80 Understandably, given the importance attached to
the right to an impartial jury, courts are wary of the lack of a jury in
courts-martial proceedings, believing them to be inferior to civilian
juries.81 The Sixth Amendment states that:
shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, by an
impartial jury of the State and district where in the crime shall
have been committed, which district shall have been previously
ascertained by law.82

However, while courts-martial do not utilize a jury of the
accused’s peers, the UCMJ does provide a very similar mechanism as
a substitute.83 While this body is known as a “panel” and is made up
of “members”,84 it essentially serves the same fact-finding roles as a
civilian jury85 by weighing evidence and adjudging a proper verdict
based on the judge’s instructions.86 Further, members of military
panels are subject to voir dire proceedings and can be peremptorily
removed by a defendant.87 Although both a military panel and civilian
jury serve essential the same function, many critics contend that a
PMC would not receive an impartial trial under military jurisdiction.88
For example, members of military of military panels are selected
solely at discretion of the convening authority of the court-martial.89

80.

United States ex rel. Toth v. Quarles, 350 U.S. 11, 16 (1955) (“Article
III, § 2, commands that the ‘Trial of all Crimes . . . shall be by Jury;
and such Trial shall be held in the State where the said Crimes shall
have been committed . . .’ And the Sixth Amendment provides that ‘In
all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy
and public trial, by an impartial jury of the state and district wherein
the crime shall have been committed . . . .’”).

81.

See id. at 17-18 ([T]here is “a great difference between trial by jury and
trial by selected members of the military forces. . . T[]he premise
underlying the constitutional method for determining guilt or innocence
in federal court is that layman are better than specialists to perform this
task.”).

82.

U.S. CONST. amend. VI.

83.

MCM, supra note 63, at pt. II, chp. V, r. 501.

84.

Peters, supra note 27, at 409-10.

85.

Behan, supra note 67, at 193.

86.

MCM, supra note 63, at pt. II, chp. V, r. 502(a)(2).

87.

Peters, supra note 27, at 410.

88.

See e.g. Hamaguchi, supra note 5, at 1058 (speculating that animosity
between the actual military personnel that populate courts-martial
panels and PMCs may lead to biases that adversely impact a PMCs
defense).

89.

Behan, supra note 67, at 193.
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3.

What Constitutional Protections Are Due to Individuals under the
UCMJ?

Irrespective of the fact that the military justice system provides
mechanisms that effectively mimic the safeguards of the Fifth and
Sixth Amendment, it may be arguable that these Constitutional
concerns are moot.90 Simply put, the status of the modern-day PMC
is much more akin to that of a soldier than a civilian.91 As will be
further discussed in this Note, it has been well-settled that the
Constitutional guarantees required in an Article III court do not
apply to the same degree in a court-martial proceeding commenced
pursuant to military law.92 This proposition was largely settled in the
United States Supreme Court case Ex parte Quirin, in which the
Court held that “the Fifth and Sixth Amendments cannot be taken to
have extended the right to demand a jury to trials by military
commission.”93 Thus, if a PMC could reasonably be shown to
constitute a de facto soldier and fall under military jurisdiction, the
claims of violation of their Constitutional rights might be largely
irrelevant.94

III. Constitutional Framework of Military Justice
In 2011 the United States Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces
affirmed the court-martial conviction of a civilian contractor, Alaa
Mohammed Ali, employed by the United States’ military to serve as a
translator in Iraq.95 Ali’s conviction, in United States v. Ali,
represented the first attempt to use the newly expanded reach of the
UCMJ to prosecute a PMC for criminal conduct.96 However, while the
decision in Ali indicates that the Amendment may survive
Constitutional scrutiny, the factual posture of Ali could distinguish
the case from future challenges. Vitally, the defendant in Ali was not
90.

Peters, supra note 27, at 410.

91.

Id. at 410.

92.

Hamaguchi, supra note 5, at 1053.

93.

Ex parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1, 39 (1942); see also Rives, supra note 2, at
16 (citing Burns v. Wilson, 346 U.S. 147 (1953) (arguing that the
holding in Burns stands for the proposition that members of the
military are guaranteed Constitutional protections to the extent that
affording these protections does not interfere with military duties and
the discipline demanded by the military)).

94.

Pearlman, supra note 74, at 6.

95.

United States v. Ali, 71 M.J. 256, 271 (C.A.A.F. 2012).

96.

See David C. Hammond, The First Prosecution of a Contractor Under
the UCMJ: Lessons for Service Contractors, SERVICE CONTRACTOR, Fall
2008, at 33.
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a United States citizen,97 rendering any potential Constitutional
violations largely irrelevant.98
The Constitution, despite granting Congress the authority to
promulgate a system of military justice, offers no specific instructions
as to when a civilian could be subjected to military law.99 Thus, the
Constitutional permissibility of expanded military jurisdiction under
the 2007 Amendment remains unresolved, and a more in-depth
examination of previous verdicts involving civilians contesting
military oversight would likely be necessary to establish how a court
may view the 2007 Amendment when applied to an American citizen.
While no prior case law speaks directly to this issue, relevant case law
does indicate that a workable solution, permitting military oversight
under the 2007 Amendment to pass Constitutional muster, could be
reached.
A.

Congressional Power to Create the Military Justice System

The concept of military oversight over civilians in general has
long served as a controversial idea, with many of the Founding
Fathers adopting Blackstone’s philosophy that military law was
“entirely arbitrary” and “in truth and reality, no law.”100 Despite the
Founder’s misgivings, the Constitution does not contain any express
restrictions on the use of military law over non-military personnel.101
Historically, since pre-Revolution days, the United States has
typically permitted varying degrees of military oversight to govern the
conduct of civilian accomplices.102
97.

Ali, 71 M.J. at 259.

98.

Id. at 269 (“We are mindful of the Supreme Court’s repeated refusals to
extend court-martial jurisdiction over civilians . . . However, those cases
are factually distinguishable because the defendants in those cases were
U.S. citizens who indisputably enjoyed the protections of the Fifth and
Sixth Amendments.”). Although the majority opinion in Ali avoids the
Constitutional question, Chief Justice Baker’s concurring opinion
concludes that irrespective of Ali’s nationality, his constitutional rights
would not have been violated as ”[i]t seems to me that if a civilian is
sufficiently integrated into the United States Armed Forces to qualify for
court-martial jurisdiction under Article 2(a)(10), UCMJ, then that same
person is sufficiently integrated so as to be entitled to those Fifth and
Sixth Amendment rights embedded in the UCMJ.” Id. at 277 (emphasis
added).

99.

See U.S. CONST.

100. Snyder, supra note 26, at 90 (quoting Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 26
(1957)) (quoting 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *413).
101. See U.S. CONST.
102. See e.g. Cullen, supra note 41, at 519 (“The 1775 Articles of War
extended the jurisdiction of military tribunals to ‘all sutlers and
retainers to a camp, and all persons whatsoever serving with the
Continental Army in the field.’”); see also Sacilotto, supra note 6, at
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Although the military justice system does adjudicate legal matters
through the use of courts-martial proceedings, a court-martial is a not
“court” in the same sense that the term “court” is understood in the
civilian justice system.103 This is because the military justice system is
not created pursuant to Article III of the Constitution, but rather,
created by Congress, pursuant to its authority in Article I of the
Constitution..104 In this sense, the military justice system acts in direct
opposition to Article III courts and “every extension of military
jurisdiction is an encroachment on the jurisdiction of the civil
courts.”105
The above cited distinction has numerous practical effects. For
example, unlike Article III courts, in which certain members of the
judiciary enjoy life tenure, there is no requirement in the military
justice system that military trial judges be given life tenure.106
Moreover, “common-law” does not exist in the military justice system:
there are only crimes which have been statutorily codified by
Congress pursuant to its Constitutional authority.107
However, the most significant result of the military justice system
being an Article I, rather than Article III creation, is what
Constitutional rights are guaranteed in the military justice system. In
sum, because a military-court martial is not a “court” as defined in
Article III of the Constitution, the Constitutional requirements of
Article III courts do not apply to the same degree in the military
justice system.108 The language of the Fifth Amendment affirms this
189 (noting that the provisions contained in the 1775 Articles were
largely carried over to 1916 Articles of War).
103. Snyder, supra note 26, at 75.
104. Geoffrey S. Corn, Bringing Discipline to the Civilianization of the
Battlefield: A Proposal for a More Legitimate Approach to Resurrecting
Military-Criminal Jurisdiction over Civilian Augmentees, 62 U. MIAMI
L. REV. 491, 526 (2008).
105. Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 21 (1957).
106. Corn, supra note 104, at 526.
107. Snyder, supra note 26, at 75.
108. Numerous courts, both civilian and military, have adopted this
proposition. See Burns, 346 U.S. 137, 140 (1953) (“Military law . . . is a
jurisprudence which exists separate and apart from the law which
governs in our federal judicial establishment . . . the rights of men in
the armed forces must perforce be conditioned to meet certain
overriding demands of discipline and duty, and the civil courts are not
the agencies which must determine the precise balance to be struck in
this adjustment. The Framers expressly entrusted that task to
Congress.”) (emphasis added); Ex parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1, 40 (1942)
(“[W]e must conclude that § 2 of Article III and the Fifth and Sixth
Amendments cannot be taken to have extended the right to demand a
jury to trials by military commission.”); Kinsella v. United States, 361
U.S. 234, 272 (“The provisions of . . . the Fifth and Sixth Amendments
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statement and explicitly differentiates the Constitutional requirements
due to military personnel by stating:
No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise
infamous crime, unless on a presentment or indictment of a
grand jury, except in cases arising in the land or naval forces,
or in the militia, when in actual service in time of war or public
danger.109

Congress’s power to regulate the laws of the military is vested in
Art. I § 8, Clause 14 of the Constitution, which grants Congress the
power to “make Rules for the Government and Regulation of the land
and naval Forces.”110 Historically, this phrase had been used in
conjunction with Art. I §8 Clause 18, which grants Congress the
power to “make all Laws which shall be necessary and proper” to
execute the powers vested in the Congress.”111 Together, these clauses
had been relied upon as a limited exception for Congress to create
legal proceedings not subject to the Constitutional rights required in
Article III courts.112

of the Constitution requiring the trial of capital or otherwise infamous
crimes in an Article III court, upon an indictment of a grand jury, by an
impartial petit jury, are not applicable to ‘cases arising in the land or
naval forces.’”) (emphasis added); United States v. Ali, 71 M.J. 256, 277
(2012) (Baker, C.J. concurring) (“[T]he Constitution delimits the
application of Fifth and Sixth Amendment to members of the United
States Armed Forces.”). Further, Baker noted that the “exception to the
requirement of indictment by grand jury ‘has been read over into the
Sixth Amendment so that the requirements of jury trial are
inapplicable.’” Id. (quoting Reid, 354 U.S. at 37 n.68); United States v.
Marcum, 60 M.J. 198, 205 (C.A.A.F. 2004) (“Constitutional rights may
apply differently” in the military context.).
109. U.S. CONST. amend. V. As noted in the preceding footnote, the military
exemption contained in the Fifth Amendment, has, by implication, been
read into the Sixth Amendment as well.
110. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 14.
111. See Ali, 71 M.J. at 269. Article I, § 8, Clause 18 of the United States
Constitution is colloquially known as the “Necessary and Proper Clause”
and acts as Congress’s authority to pass laws necessary to effectuate its
Constitutionally enumerated powers.
112. Kinsella v. United States ex rel. Singleton, 361 U.S. 234, 237-38, 246-47
(1960); see also Reid, 354 U.S. at 42 (Frankfurter, J., concurring)
(noting that persons subject to courts-martial are not protected by the
specific provisions of Art. III, nor are they guaranteed the rights granted
by the Fifth or Sixth Amendment).
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B.

Military and Civilians: When Can Civilians Fall Under Military
Jurisdiction?

As held in Reid, however, Congress’s ability to create the laws of
the military cannot be extended to civilians through the Necessary
and Proper Clause alone.113 Instead, contemporary courts have held
that it is Congress’s “war-powers” and the implied powers derived
from them, which act as the source and authority permitting Congress
to extend Article I § 8, Clause 14 to civilians.114 In Ali, the concurring
opinion described these powers as being found in Article I, § 8,
Clauses 10-13, 16.115 Among these powers include:
The power to . . . raise and support armies; provide and
maintain a navy; and to provide for organizing, arming, and
discipline the military.116

While Congress’s power to promulgate a military justice system
separate and apart from the civilian justice is well-settled, courts have
historically been loath to allow the extension of military justice to
civilians and thus deprive them of the full gambit of Constitutional
protections guaranteed in Article III courts.117 In Ex parte Milligan,
the Supreme Court established the proposition that if civilian courts
are “open,” then military jurisdiction of civilians is improper.118 The
Court in Reid reaffirmed this proposition, holding that:

113. Reid, 354 U.S. at 22.
114. Ali, 71 M.J. at 269-70 (quoting Reid, 354 U.S. at 33) (“To the extent
that these cases can be justified, insofar as they involved trial of persons
who were not ‘members’ of the armed forces, they must rest on the
Government’s ‘war powers.’”).
115. Ali, 71 M.J. at 273 (Baker, C.J., concurring).
116. Id. (emphasis added).
117. See, e.g., Reid, 354 U.S. at 19 (“Article I, § 8, cl. 14 empowers Congress
‘To make Rules for the Government and Regulation of the land and
naval Forces’ . . . But if the language of Clause 14 is given its natural
meaning, the power granted does not extend to civilians.”).
118. Ex parte Milligan, 71 U.S. 2, 123 (“Congress has declared the kinds of
trial . . . for offences committed while the party is in the military or
naval service. Every one [sic] connected with these branches . . . is
amenable to the jurisdiction which Congress has created for their
government . . . All other persons, citizens of states where the courts are
open, if charged with crime, are guaranteed the inestimable privilege of
trial by jury.”) (emphasis added). The court went on to further state
that “[i]t follows, from what has been said on this subject, that there are
occasions when martial rule can be properly applied . . . [but] if this
government is continued after the courts are reinstated, it is a gross
usurpation of power. Martial rule can never exist where the courts are
open.”) Id. at 127 (emphasis added).
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civilian courts are the normal repositories of power to try
persons charged with crimes against the United States . . . the
jurisdiction of military tribunals is a very limited and
extraordinary jurisdiction derived from the cryptic language in
Art. I, § 8, and, at most, was intended to be only a narrow
exception to the normal and preferred method of trial in courts
of law.119

Moreover, courts have historically held that military jurisdiction
over civilians is only permissible if the civilian could be determined to
be within the language of Article I, § 8 Clause 14.120 Justice
Frankfurter’s concurring opinion in Reid succinctly highlights this
proposition when he states:
trial by court-martial is constitutionally permissible only for
persons who can, on a fair appraisal, be regarded as falling
within the authority given to Congress under Article I, § 8,
Clause 14 to regulate the “land and naval Forces.121

In sum, while the ability of Congress to promulgate the UCMJ
and permit court-martials in the military is well-settled, courts have
often cautioned that courts-martial are to be last-resort for trying
civilians,122 and that a civilian must “reach the level of land and
naval forces” to fall under military jurisdiction.123 Thus, to prosecute a
PMC under the UCMJ they would have to be sufficiently shown to be
a de facto member of the military and further, no other methods of
adjudication would be available to ensure accountability for criminal
action.

119. Reid, 354 U.S. at 21 (emphasis added).
120. See id. at 22-23 (“[T]he authority conferred by Clause 14 does not
encompass persons who cannot fairly be said to be ‘in’ the military
service . . . We recognize that there might be circumstances where a
person could be ‘in’ the armed services for purposes of Clause 14 even
though he had not formally been inducted into the military or did not
wear a uniform.”).
121. Id. at 42 (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
122. See generally United States ex rel. Toth v. Quarles, 350 U.S. 11, 23
(1955) (Cautioning that the authority to convene a court-martial must
be limited to the least amount of power required to achieve the
proposed end); see also Milligan, 71 U.S. at 119, ([M]ilitary tribunals for
civilians . . . whether in war or peace, are inconsistent with the liberty
of the citizen, and can have no place in constitutional government.”).
123. See Reid, 354 U.S. at 22-23 (noting that a civilian could fall within the
land and naval forces depending on the circumstances of that civilian’s
association with the military, but holding that a dependent of a service
member did not reach the level of “land and naval” forces as to fall
under Article I, § 8 Clause 14).
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IV. Reining in PMC Behavior: Why Alternatives to
Military Justice Fail
A.

Why Do We Need to Hold PMCs Accountable?

Although numerous Blackwater operatives involved in the Nisour
Square shooting would eventually be convicted for their roles in the
tragedy, the first attempt to prosecute the instigators resulted in
dismissal of charges.124 Following the dismissal, Iraqi citizens, many of
whom were victims of the attack, expressed their dismay with the
decision, believing it represented a concerted effort by the American
judicial system to shelter the perpetrators of the attack.125 As one
victim asked
What are we — not human? Why do they have the right to kill
people? Is our blood so cheap? For America, the land of justice
and law, what does it mean to let criminals go?126

This response illustrates the perception created by America’s
heavy reliance on PMCs. Although the term “mercenary” may be
somewhat of a misnomer,127 many view PMC as nothing more than
“guns for hire” with little regard for the well-being of innocent
civilians.128 Unsurprisingly, this negative association of PMC has a
profound impact on the perception of the American military, which
often works in in close conjunction with PMCs.129
Shortly after the massacre at Nisour Square, one witness to the
attack stated that

124. Timothy Williams, Iraqis Angered as Blackwater Charges Are Dropped,
N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 1, 2010), http://www.nytimes.com/2010/01/02/us/
02blackwater.html [https://perma.cc/FFT4-9X9D].
125. Id.
126. Id. (quoting Abdul Wahab Adul Khader, a 34-year-old bank employee
and one of at least 20 people wounded in the melee).
127. Singer, supra note 33, at 42-44.
128. Id. at 44 (quoting Abdel-Fatau Musah, who claims that there is no
distinction between the historical mercenary and contemporary PMCs,
and that “private military companies are nothing but the old poison of
vagabond mercenaries in new designer bottles.”).
129. See Cullen, supra note 41, at 515-16 (noting that not only are PMCs
often heavily armed, they frequently serve in close proximity to local
populations. Moreover, because these PMCs are frequently in close
contact with United States military and government personnel, when
they do commit crimes, local populous have a difficult time
distinguishing the conduct and simply associate PMC conduct with
official United States policy).

327

Case Western Reserve Journal of International Law 50 (2018)
If it Looks Like a Duck
when someone . . . gets killed by an American and that
American is protected-untouchable, this will definitely create
new enemies for the United States.130

Such a mindset reflects perhaps the most compelling argument for the
extension of military jurisdiction over PMC: when PMCs engage in
criminal conduct and go unpunished, American military efforts can be
greatly harmed.131
The Nisour Square massacre, however, is far from the only
contemporary example of PMC misconduct resulting in harm to
foreign civilians.132 On a hot day in July 2006, a PMC employed by an
American contracting firm called Triple Canopy bluntly told his
colleagues that he was “going to kill someone today.”133 As the group’s
vehicle approached the Baghdad Airport, the PMC jumped out of the
vehicle and fired several rounds from his M4 rifle into a truck parked
nearby.134 The perpetrator’s colleagues stated that the truck did not
pose a threat, nor was the team in danger at the time of the attack.135
Unsatisfied with this amount of bloodshed, the PMC proclaimed
“I’ve [sic] never shot anyone with my pistol before,” un-holstered his
sidearm, and proceeded to fire seven or eight rounds into the
windshield of a nearby taxi.136 The perpetrator of these attacks, Jacob
Washburn, was never prosecuted for his actions despite his colleagues
reporting the incidents to their employer.137 Instead, Triple Canopy
terminated Washburn’s colleagues, a jury cleared Triple Canopy of
any wrongdoing, and there was no determination of whether any Iraqi
civilians were killed or injured that July day.138

130. Snyder, supra note 26, at 97.
131. Cullen, supra note 41, at 514 (describing the negative consequences of
PMC misconduct on military morale, as well as the adverse impact
PMCs can have on the implementation of certain policies and strategic
choices.
132. C.J. Chivers, Contractor’s Boss in Iraq Shot at Civilians, Worker’s Suit
Says, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 17, 2006), http://www.nytimes.com/2006/
11/17/world/middleeast/17contractors.html
[https://perma.cc/SG4HUUE7].
133. Id.
134. Id.
135. Id.
136. Id.
137. Tom Jackman, Security Contractor Cleared in Two Firings, WASH.
POST
(Aug.
2,
2007),
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wpdyn/content/article/2007/08/01/AR2007080102350.html
[https://perma.cc/44TW-XZ52].
138. Id.

328

Case Western Reserve Journal of International Law 50 (2018)
If it Looks Like a Duck

The failure to prosecute Blackwater and Triple Canopy employees
are indicative of the largely under-regulated behavior of PMCs, but
the failure to prosecute PMCs goes far beyond just these two notable
examples.139 For example, in 2007, at the height of the Iraq War,
there were approximately 180,000 contractors, of all types, serving
with the United States military.140 About 30,000 of these contractors
were the type of PMCs of chief concern to this Note.141 Yet, despite
the fact that PMCs served in such great numbers, prosecutions for
criminal activity were few and far between.142 As one commentator
pointed out, it would be a very charitable, if not naïve assumption,
to believe that not one PMC had committed any sort of criminal
action during the first few years of the Iraq War.143
B.

Alternatives to Subjecting PMCs to Military Jurisdiction

In light of the foregoing, it is apparent that the existing legal
landscape has failed to regulate the conduct of PMCs, thus
necessitating the extension of military jurisdiction over PMCs. Critics,
however, may argue that existing mechanisms, namely the Military
Extraterritorial Jurisdiction Act (“MEJA”), are sufficient to hold
PMCs accountable.144 Bearing in mind the well-settled presumption
that civilians should be subjected to Article III courts unless there are
not ready alternatives,145 this Note will consider MEJA as the most
persuasive argument against extended military jurisdiction. However,

139. Hurst, supra note 29, at 1316-18.
140. Id. at 1310.
141. Snyder, supra note 26, at 68.
142. See Peters, supra note 27, at 367 (claiming that, as of 2006, there had
been zero prosecutions of a PMC for criminal conduct despite the fact
PMCs had been serving in large numbers for over two years. In
contrast, dozens of United States military personnel were convicted of
criminal conduct in the same time period); see also Snyder, supra note
26, at 68 (noting how, by 2008, there had been only one prosecution of a
PMC for criminal action despite the large number of PMCs present in
the country).
143. Id. at 367.
144. Dan Stigall, An Unnecessary Convenience: The Assertion of the
Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ) over Civilians and the
Implications of International Human Rights Law, 17 CARDOZO J. OF
INT’L. & COMP. L. 59, 61(2009).
145. See generally Ex parte Milligan, 71 U.S. 2 (discusses writs of habeas
corpus and the jurisdiction of military commissions); see also Reid v.
Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 21 (1956) (noting that civilian courts are the
“normal repositories of power to try persons charged with crimes against
the United States.”).
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for a variety of reasons, MEJA does not effectively mitigate
jurisdictional gaps created by PMCs’ unique role.146
1.

Military Extraterritorial Jurisdiction Act

The ideal alternative to subjecting a civilian contractor to
military jurisdiction is to simply subject civilians to existing criminal
law in the continental United States, regardless of where the alleged
criminal activity occurs. While such a solution is undoubtedly enticing
in theory, such extraterritorial extension of domestic criminal law is
plagued by a host of pragmatic concerns, effectively rendering such
extension insufficient for purposes of ensuring criminal accountability
of PMCs serving abroad.
The most significant attempt to rein in civilian contractors
conduct through extension of domestic criminal law occurred with the
passage of MEJA in 2000.147 MEJA was largely a response to roughly
thirty years of nearly unregulated PMC conduct in the wake of
various court decisions.148 By passing MEJA, Congress gave the
Department of Justice jurisdiction to pursue criminal actions against
overseas contractors if the crime would constitute a felony when
committed on United States’ soil.149 Initially, MEJA’s provisions only
applied to Department of Defense contractors,150 meaning that the
perpetrators of the notorious Abu Ghraib prison scandal, largely
contractors retained by the Department of State, fell outside the act’s
146. Stigall, supra note 144, at 68-69.
147. Id. at 70.
148. David Ehrhart, Closing the Gap: The Continuing Search for
Accountability of Civilian Contractors Accompanying the Force, 34 THE
REP. 10, 13 (2008); see also Glenn R. Schmidt, Closing the Gap in
Criminal Jurisdiction over Civilians Accompanying the Armed Forces
Abroad– A First Person Account of the Creation of the Military
Extraterritorial Jurisdiction Act of 2000 51 CATHOLIC UNI. L. REV. 7, 74
(describing the finding of 1979 General Accounting Office report on
contractor misconduct preceding MEJA’s enactment. The report
detailed numerous instances of civilian crime while accompanying
military forces, including fifty-nine “serious” offenses, such as rape,
arson, and murder, over a year-long span. The report further noted that
a lack of ability to prosecute such crimes had a detrimental effect on
military operations and “caused serious morale and discipline problems
in overseas military communities.”).
149. 18 U.S.C. § 3261 (2000) (MEJA has four prerequisites for Department of
Justice jurisdiction: 1) the offense is punishable by more than a year’s
imprisonment; 2) the conduct occurred outside the United States; 3) the
offense was committed by a member of the U.S. Armed Forces or a
person accompanying and/or employed by the Armed Forces; and 4) the
conduct occurred within the scope of the maritime and territorial
jurisdiction of the United States).
150. Ehrhart, supra note 148, at 15.
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reach.151 While Congress would eventually rectify this oversight in
2004,152 this mistake foreshadowed problems to come, as MEJA
continued to be plagued by pragmatic concerns which largely sapped
it of any genuine effectiveness in prosecuting PMC misconduct.153
The pragmatic shortcomings of MEJA are readily apparent upon
examination of the Act. Chief amongst these is MEJAs reliance on
stateside, Department of Justice attorneys, whom are tasked with
pursuing prosecutions of criminal acts alleged to have occurred
thousands of miles away.154 This expansive distance places an
incredibly burdensome weight on Department of Justice prosecutors
to carry out even the most basic of legal task associated with
preparation for litigation.155 For example, the vast distances makes
taking a simple deposition an incredibly difficult task.156 Additionally,
MEJA fails to consider the inherent difficulties that manifest when
attempting to procure witnesses and compel them to testify; it is
highly unlikely that many foreign nationals, witness to a crime
perpetrated by an American PMC, would be excited at the prospect
of traveling to American soil to testify against an American citizen,
lest they face reprisals for their testimony.157
MEJA’s reliance on stateside prosecutors also creates massive
evidentiary concerns, such as spoliation of vital evidence. Such fears
are certainly not unwarranted; for example, in the wake of the Nisour
Square shootings, it took stateside investigators from the FBI nearly
two weeks to reach Baghdad and commence their investigation into
the shooting.158 By that point, Blackwater employees had taken steps
to repair and repaint vehicles that had been involved in the
altercation, severely compromising important evidence in the
process.159
151. CONTRACTORS AND WAR: LEGAL ASPECTS OF FUTURE U.S. OPERATIONS
213 (Malcolm Patterson & Christopher Kinsey eds., 2012).
152. Ehrhart, supra note 148, at 15.
153. See generally MILITARY CONTRACTORS LEGAL STATUS, OVERSIGHT, AND
SECURITY (Richard Quigly ed., 2009) (noting that from MEJA’s
enactment in 2000 through 2008, only 58 cases of contractor misconduct
were referred to the Department of Justice, of which, only 13 made it to
trial).
154. Singer, supra note 44.
155. Id.
156. Id.
157. Id.
158. Chapman, supra note 12, at 1066.
159. See id. at 1066-1067 (noting that while stateside investigators took
nearly two weeks to reach the site of the shooting, American military
personnel were able to reach the scene in roughly twenty-five minutes).
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The nature of the locales MEJA would conceivably force stateside
prosecutors to travel dangerous and remote conflict zones, which
further impairs its effectiveness. For example, some commentators
have pointed out that a PMC employed by a contracting firm could
conceivably be reassigned to a different state in the intervening time
between criminal act and the Department of Justice commencing a
criminal investigation.160 Moreover, as PMCs frequently accompany
military forces in active war zones, there could be a very real threat
that a contractor may be injured or even killed before a stateside
prosecutor could reach the PMC.161 A last complication created by
MEJA inserting stateside prosecutors into hostile territory is the
inherent danger posed to the attorneys from security risks inherent
with war zones. These dangers have led to ironic, if not compromising
situations, in which investigating agents and attorneys’ security
details were provided by the very contracting firms whose employees
were accused of criminal activity.162
Despite MEJA’s apparent ineffectiveness in holding PMCs
criminally accountable for their overseas conduct, the Act still
remains operative and theoretically available to prosecute criminal
action of PMCs accompanying military forces.163 In 2008, after the
2007 Amendment was entered into law, Secretary of Defense Robert
Gates issued a statement clarifying the concurrent relationship
between MEJA and the UCMJ.164
In this memorandum, Gates noted the potential for expanded
military jurisdiction to create legal issues and cautioned against
excessive utilization of military jurisdiction over civilians.165 To wit,
Gates stated that upon the Department of Defense notifying the
Department of Justice of potential criminal conduct, the Department
of Justice would be afforded “the opportunity to pursue its
160. See Singer, supra note 44 (noting that a contractor originally employed
in Iraq could very be easily reassigned to an equally far-flung locale such
as Sudan or the Philippines).
161. See Chapman, supra note 12, at 1066 (noting the lack of motivation to
prosecute PMCs due to issues of traveling and building a case within
war zones).
162. See id. at 1066 (noting that Blackwater, through its contract with the
Department of State, was responsible for providing security details for
the investigating agents from the Department of State in the wake of
the Nisour Square Shootings).
163. Stigall, supra note 144, at 70-72.
164. Id. at 72.
165. Memorandum from Secretary of Defense Robert Gates to Secretaries of
the Military Departments, (Mar. 10, 2008) (cautioning that “[t]he
unique nature of this extended UCMJ jurisdiction over civilians requires
sound management over when, where, and by whom such jurisdiction is
exercised.”) (emphasis added) [hereinafter Gates Memorandum].
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prosecution . . . in federal district court.”166 This likely indicates a
preference that the Department of Justice prosecute the case, but if
unable or unwilling to, the military would be permitted to step in to
fill the jurisdictional void and pursue criminal prosecution pursuant to
Article 2(a)(10) of the UCMJ.
Under this framework, the Department of Justice would still be
notified first and “given the opportunity to pursue its prosecution of
its case in federal district court.”167 In the interim, however, military
commanders were instructed to conduct customary pre-trial
investigations,
in
preparation
for
potential
court-martial
proceedings.168 In sum, Department of Justice prosecutors would
generally be assumed to have “first-choice” in pursuing a criminal
investigation of alleged PMC misconduct, while military personnel are
simultaneously allowed to conduct their own investigation in the
event the Department of Justice declines to indict a PMC.
As some have cautioned, however, mere pragmatic difficulties
associated with trying PMCs in Article III courts may not render
these courts unavailable.169 To be more specific, there is a concern
that even if prosecution under MEJA is de facto unavailable for
reasons previously discussed, prosecution is still technically available
in an Article III court.170 As such, prosecution of a civilian pursuant to
the UCMJ is not truly a last-resort.
While such concerns are compelling, dicta in Ali does indicate
courts are cognizant of the pragmatic challenges that largely render

166. Id. (emphasis added).
167. Stigall, supra note 144, at 72 (quoting Gates Memorandum, supra note
165).
168. See id. at 72 (noting that Secretary Gates memorandum stated that
“While the DOJ notification and decision process is pending,
commanders and military criminal investigators should continue to
address the alleged crime. Commanders should ensure that any
preliminary military justice procedures that would be required in
support of the exercise of UCMJ jurisdiction over civilians continue to
be accomplished during the concurrent DOJ notification process.
Commanders should be prepared to act, as appropriate, should possible
U.S. federal criminal jurisdiction prove to be unavailable to address the
alleged criminal behavior.”).
169. See Price, supra note 11, at 502 (noting that a court may be compelled
to find that the mere existence of an Article III court could mean that
an Article III court is available, irrespective of the pragmatic difficulties
that exist).
170. See id. at 502 (“At the same time, the mere existence of MEJA could
nullify such an argument because even if DOJ chooses not to pursue a
case, the possibility of prosecution in an Article III court remains
available and may make it unconstitutional to pursue prosecution in a
limited-rights venue like a court-martial.”).

333

Case Western Reserve Journal of International Law 50 (2018)
If it Looks Like a Duck

MEJA unavailable as a tool for prosecuting PMCs on foreign soil,171
which may help dispel the notion that MEJA is a viable alternative.
Moreover, the Gates’s memorandum may provide a solution to this
conundrum in its implied suggestion of a “tiered-system” of
jurisdiction.172 For example, the Department of Justice could be given
an opportunity to prosecute a PMC under MEJA. But if, for example,
the Department of Justice elected to not pursue the matter for
pragmatic reasons, it could expressly deny jurisdiction and pass the
case to the military. In doing so, the Department of Justice would, in
effect, be closing the doors of Article III courts to PMCs, leaving the
military justice system as a true last-resort.
2.

Other Alternatives to Military Jurisdiction

While MEJA will be considered to be the “best” alternative to the
extension of military jurisdiction, it should be noted that some have
argued that other alternatives exist.173 Thus, these alternatives will be
briefly noted. First, some contend that PMCs could merely be
subjected to the laws of the “host” nation where they are currently
serving.174 Secondly, some have advocated for PMCs to be subjected
to international law, namely the provisions of the Geneva
Convention.175 It is likely, however, that many of the same
Constitutional concerns raised by subjecting PMCs to military
jurisdiction would be present under these alternatives. For example,
as one commentator notes, subjecting PMCs to either of these
alternatives could lead to unpredictable or inconsistent results.176 To
wit, under both of these alternatives, a PMC could face liability for
criminal action in one country, while a PMC in a different nation
would not be held culpable for the same conduct.177 Moreover, under
international law, PMCs could face different liability merely based on
their own nationality.178 Under both of these examples, PMCs would
171. United States v. Ali, 71 M.J. 256, 259 (2012) (noting that the dicta in
the lower court’s opinion pointed to the resource challenges - it was
easier to hold a court-martial than to send the defendant to the United
States to be prosecuted in federal court).
172. Gates Memorandum.
173. Hurst, supra note 29, at 1311.
174. See e.g. id. at 1311 (arguing for the creation of a “tiered” system of
jurisdiction in which host-nation law is given preference over United
States military jurisdiction).
175. See generally Stigall, supra note 144 (contending that UCMJ
jurisdiction is largely unnecessary, as international law would be
sufficient to hold PMCs accountable).
176. Chapman, supra note 12, at 1059-1063.
177. Id. at 1063.
178. Id.
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be left guessing as to what is or is not criminal conduct, leading to
equitable concerns that are not as prevalent under military law.
The pragmatic and equitable concerns of these above cited
alternatives notwithstanding, these alternatives should not be
considered “true” alternatives, as they are not Article III courts.
Thus, for purposes of this Note, MEJA will be the most “important”
alternative considered.

V. Civilians in the “Land and Naval Forces”:
Distinguishing Contemporary PMCs from Other
Civilians
A.

Role of the Civilian Contractor: Then and Now

As some have put it, the modern-day PMC is tasked with duties
that are far more demanding than simply cooking or doing laundry for
the military.179 The massive increase in the use of civilian contractors
can in part be explained by increasing reliance on technically
sophisticated weapons platforms, which frequently demand
examination, maintenance, or calibration.180 More importantly, the
end of the Cold War drastically increased the demand for PMCs
acting as fill-ins for actual soldiers.181 Some have even noted that the
increase may have partially been spurred by the fact it is more
politically palatable to stomach the deaths and causalities of PMCs,
rather than actual soldiers.182
PMCs in contemporary times are frequently tasked with combatrelated roles including armed security, target specialists, and
reconnaissance operations.183 Additionally, PMCs have served vital
roles in the procurement and analysis of military intelligence.184 Some
PMCs have also been used similar to military personnel, in that they
are deployed to the battlefield in large numbers and supported by a
179. Jon D. Michaels, Beyond Accountability: The Constitutional,
Democratic, and Strategic Problems with Privatizing War, 82 WASH. U.
L. Q. 1001, 1019.
180. Lindemann, supra note 24, at 84.
181. See Singer, supra note 33, at 49 (noting that the end of the Cold War
drastically increased the use of PMC as quasi-soldiers for numerous
reasons.); see also Michaels, supra note 124, at 1020 (noting that along
with technological transformations, considerable cutbacks in military
spending in the early 1990’s has helped lead to increased utilization of
private contractors as combat-forces).
182. Peter
Singer,
Outsourcing
War,
BROOKINGS,
https://www.brookings.edu/articles/outsourcing-war/ (Mar. 1, 2005)
[https://perma.cc/M4XF-VVE8].
183. Snyder, supra note 26, at 71.
184. Singer, supra note 33, at 248.

335

Case Western Reserve Journal of International Law 50 (2018)
If it Looks Like a Duck

wide array of military air and artillery support units.185 These tasks
often blur the conventional civilian-soldier divide and were once the
exclusive domain of enlisted soldiers.186 Moreover, private military
firms, such as Blackwater, often “recruit” employees direct from the
various military branches of the United States, giving many PMCs
the same valuable military training active soldiers receive.187
Combat operations are not the only area in which PMCs have
encroached on the traditional domain of soldiers. For example,
contemporary PMCs have been tasked with overseeing and
instructing cadets in Reserve Officer Training Programs, as well as
assisting senior military officers in making military decisions and staff
planning.188 To wit, prior to the invasion of Iraq, PMCs assisted
military planners with “war-gaming” and conducting field exercises in
the lead up to invasion.189 Further, in numerous instances after the
fall of Saddam Hussein, PMCs provided training for Iraqi military and
police forces.190 PMCs are also a vital component of security details,
providing security on military bases and security details for American
military convoys.191 Some PMCs even built and guarded the United
States main forward operating base, Camp Doha, in Kuwait.192
Moreover, PMCs are frequently tasked with manning and
maintaining military weaponry and equipment. As Peter Singer notes,
PMCs in Iraq were often tasked with maintaining and arming highly
sophisticated weapons platforms such as the F-15 fighter, F-117
stealth fighter, and U-2 reconnaissance aircraft.193 In some cases,
PMCs did more than just maintain these systems; for example, PMCs
have operated combat systems such as the Global Hawk UAV and air
185. Snyder, supra note 26, at 71.
186. Michaels, supra note 179, at 1019; see also Sacilotto, supra note 6, at
181 quoting U.S. Gov. Accountability Office (“The U.S. military has
long used contractors to provide supplies and services to deployed U.S.
forces. . . Today, contractors provide deployed U.S. forces with
communication services; interpreters who accompany military patrols;
base operations support (e.g., food and housing); weapons systems
maintenance; intelligence analysis; and a variety of other support. Many
of these contractors live and work side by side with their military
counterparts and share many of the same risks and hardships”)
(emphasis added).
187. Hamaguchi, supra note 5, at 1058 (2008); see also Singer, supra note 33,
at 76.
188. Peters, supra note 27, at 383.
189. Singer, supra note 33, at 247.
190. Id. at 248.
191. Cullen, supra note 41, at 513.
192. Singer, supra note 33, at 247.
193. Id.
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defense systems such as Patriot Missile batteries, as well as defense
systems on board United States Navy vessels.194
B.

The Civilian and Military Justice: Who Falls Under Military
Jurisdiction and What Crimes Are Applicable to PMCs?

The second prong to be considered when analyzing the
permissibility of subjecting an individual to military jurisdiction is
whether said individual could reasonably be determined to be in the
land or naval forces.195 Based on an examination of relevant case law,
a PMC could conceivably be considered to be in the land or naval
forces, if: (1) they serve active and significant or vital roles in regards
to military operations, and; (2) undertake these roles while
accompanying military forces “in the field”, during times of active
hostilities. For the reasons discussed in the preceding section, this
Note contends that the soldier-like roles filled by PMCs in
contemporary times renders PMCs de-facto military. Thus, this Note
argues that PMCs constitute a unique class of civilians, separate from
the types of civilians that have been historically exempted from
military jurisdiction. As a result, the extension of military jurisdiction
to PMCs is permissible.
1.

Vital Cogs: Comparing the Role of Contemporary PMCs to Other
Civilians

For a PMC to fall under military jurisdiction, it would have to be
shown that they were sufficiently “soldier-like” as to be considered a
de facto member of the United States land and naval forces.196 That
is, a PMC would likely have to have a significant and on-going
connection with the military. Additionally, there would likely need to
be articulable facts that indicate a PMC was integral to the military
due to their role.
One of the earliest Supreme Court cases addressing the
permissibility of military jurisdiction over civilians was Ex parte
Milligan, which was decided soon after the United States Civil War.197
In Milligan, the defendant, a citizen of Indiana was sentenced to
death by a military commission.198 The Supreme Court, however,
granted defendant’s writ of habeas corpus, holding that the
defendant’s Fifth and Sixth Amendment rights were violated by being
subjected to a military trial.199
194. Id.
195. Price, supra note 11, at 501.
196. Chapman, supra note 12, at 1071.
197. Id. at 1068.
198. Ex parte Milligan, 71 U.S. 2, 123(1866).
199. Id. at 123.
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Although Milligan largely stands for the proposition that an open
and functioning Article III court is the proper venue for a civilian
accused of criminal conduct,200 the Milligan opinion also speaks to a
civilian’s role within the military. Numerous times throughout its
opinion, the majority stresses the fact that the defendant was neither
in active military service, nor did he have any connection, substantial
or otherwise, with military forces of the United States.201 As some
commentators have pointed out, however, it is likely the modern-day
PMC is distinguishable from the defendant in Milligan.202 Unlike the
Milligan defendant, who had absolutely no connection with any
military force, PMCs are deeply ingrained with the military and often
serve in roles that are vital to the success of military operations.
In the decades following Milligan, the Supreme Court would
decide a series of cases which are likely relevant to determining the
status of the modern-day PMC. In both Ex parte Reed and Johnson
v. Sayre, the Court held that civilian employees of the Navy had been
sufficiently integrated into the military to fall under the military
justice system’s jurisdiction.203
Both Reed and Sayre were civilian employees, serving as
“paymasters” for the Navy.204 In Reed, the Court described the
significant role that a paymaster held within the Navy, stating that:
The place of paymaster’s clerk is an important one in
the machinery of the navy . . . The good order and efficiency of
the service depend largely upon the faithful performance of their
duties.205

The Court in Sayre would reaffirm the belief that a paymaster was
sufficiently integrated with the Navy, holding that:
[Sayre] was therefore, as has been directly adjudged by this
court, a person in the naval service . . . and subject to be tried .
. . by a general court martial.206

In a similar fashion, PMCs could be considered sufficiently
integrated into the armed forces. For instance, some PMCs dress in
200. Id. at 127.
201. See generally id.
202. Chapman, supra note 12, at 1068.
203. Ex parte Reed, 100 U.S. 13, 21 (denying applicants writ for habeas
corpus); Johnson v. Sayre, 158 U.S. 109, 118 (reversing appellate court’s
decision, and remanding applicant to military custody).
204. See Reed, 100 U.S.; Sayre 158 U.S.
205. Reed, 100 U.S. at 21-22 (emphasis added) (internal citations omitted).
206. Sayre, 158 U.S. 15 (citing Reed, 100 U.S.).
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military-style uniforms,207 and as has been previously mentioned in
this Note, PMCs and American troops are frequently considered by
local populations to be one in the same.208 More importantly, PMCs
serve a vital role in the modern-day American military; not only do
PMCs serve in numbers that have surpassed actual military
personnel, but they serve in increasingly vital roles which are essential
to the military’s objectives.209 Perhaps the most revealing insight into
how PMCs are utilized is the fact that PMCs die in fairly significant
numbers serving with the military.210
It is also interesting to note that both Reed and Sayre involved
civilians who had signed agreements in which they agreed to subject
themselves to the laws of the military.211 A later Supreme Court case,
McElroy v. United States, cited Sayre and noted that the lack of a
contractual stipulation was a factor that suggested the defendant did
not fall under the jurisdiction of the military.212 A similar clause was
briefly considered in Ali, where the Court noted that Ali’s contract
did not contain a clause informing Ali of his potential liability under
the UCMJ.213 Yet, the Court held this did not preclude the court from
holding Ali fell under the jurisdiction of the court-martial.214 Thus, in
light of Ali, Sayre, Reed, and McElroy, a court ruling on the status of
a PMC may view such a contract as evidence that a PMC should fall
under the jurisdiction of the military justice system. While such a
provision would likely not be dispositive as to a PMCs status, the
existence of a provision may be indicative of a significant relationship
between a PMC and the military.
207. Chapman, supra note 12, at 1049.
208. Lindemann, supra note 24, at 85 ((citing Rene Merle, Census Counts
100,000
Contractors
in
Iraq,
WASHINGTON
POST,
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wpdyn/content/article/2006/12/04/A
R2006120401311.html) (quoting Major General William L. Nash) (“If
you’re trying to win hearts and minds and the contractor is driving 90
miles per hour through the streets and running over kids, that’s not
helping the image of the American army. The Iraqis aren’t going to
distinguish
between
a
contractor
and
a
soldier.”))
[https://perma.cc/CL6W-2V3Y].
209. See Singer, supra note 33, at 248 (stating that “[t]he Iraq operation
could not have been carried out without private military support.”).
210. See Lindemann, supra note 24 (noting that by 2007, over 900 PMCs had
been killed in Iraq. Additionally, over 12,000 contractors were wounded
in the same time frame.)
211. Ex parte Reed, 100 U.S 13, 19; Johnson v. Sayre, 158 U.S. 109, 118.
212. McElroy v. United States, 361 U.S. 281, 285 (1959).
213. United States v. Ali, 71 M.J. 256, 259 (2012).
214. Id. at 259 (stating that “the contract stated that the work may take
place in a combat zone or other dangerous environment but did not
contain a provision notifying Ali that he was subject to the UCMJ.”).
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In United States ex rel. Toth v. Quarles, 350 U.S. 11, (1955), the
Court held that the UCMJ does not apply to ex-service members who
have “severed all relationships with the military.”215 Quarles, who had
served in Korea, was honorably-discharged.216 Five months after his
discharge, however, Quarles was arrested by military authorities on
charges of a murder committed while he was in service and taken to
Korea to stand trial by court-martial.217
While the Court did acknowledge that Congress, as authorized by
Article I of the Constitution, has the power to subject persons in the
armed service to trial by court-martial, the Court held that:
It has never been intimated by this Court, however, that Article
I military jurisdiction could be extended to civilian ex-soldiers
who had severed all relationship with the military and its
institutions.218

In declining to extend military jurisdiction to former service members,
the Court explicitly noted that permitting such jurisdiction would
“necessarily encroach on the jurisdiction of federal courts set up under
Article III of the Constitution.”219
Quarles thus reflects the belief that military jurisdiction may only
be extended to those individuals that have an active or on-going
connection or relationship with the military.220 As with the Court in
Reid, however, the Court in Quarles failed to explicitly enumerate the
type of connection or relationship a civilian must have with the
military, and the Court merely held that a connection of some kind is
a condition precedent.221 In sum, Quarles does not appear to
definitively bar military jurisdiction over all civilians, just those that
lack an existing or active connection with the military.
Decided shortly after Quarles, and the enactment of the UCMJ,
Reid v. Covert stands as the landmark case involving military
jurisdiction over civilians.222 In Reid, the Supreme Court granted writs
of habeas corpus to the wives of American service members after the

215. United States ex rel. Toth v. Quarles, 350 U.S. 11, 14 (1955).
216. Id. at 13.
217. Id.
218. Id. at 14 (emphasis added).
219. Id. at 15.
220. Id.
221. See generally id. at 23 (“We hold that Congress cannot subject civilians
like Toth to trial by court-martial.”).
222. Corn, supra note at 104, at 494.

340

Case Western Reserve Journal of International Law 50 (2018)
If it Looks Like a Duck

wives had been convicted of murder by courts-martial.223 The Court
held that the wives’ conviction violated their Constitutional rights to
a jury and grand-jury indictment, as the wives were merely
dependents of military forces, and thus did not lose their civilian
status.224
While it is well-settled that Reid stands for the fact that a
citizen’s Constitutional rights “follow” them outside of the territorial
limits of the United States,225 it is just as important to highlight what
the Court did not say in Reid. First, the plurality opinion based its
holding largely on the fact that defendants were merely dependents of
military force and that the dependents were convicted of capital
offenses during a time of peace.226 Secondly, the Court addressed an
entirely different provision of the UCMJ, as the defendants were
convicted pursuant to Article 2(11) of the UCMJ.227 Lastly, the Court
failed to draw a bright-line rule between civilians and military, stating
that:
Even if it were possible, we need not attempt here to precisely
define the boundary between ‘civilians’ and members of the ‘land
and naval Forces.” We recognize that there might be
circumstances where a person could be ‘in’ the armed services
for purposes of Clause 14 even though he had not formally been
inducted into the military or did not wear a uniform.228

In light of these omissions, some have proffered that Reid does
not foreclose on all military jurisdiction of civilians and that the
223. See generally Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 18-19 (“[W]e conclude that the
Constitution in its entirety applied to the trials of Mrs. Smith and Mrs.
Covert. Since their courtmartial did not meet the requirements of Art.
III, s 2, or the Fifth and Sixth Amendments we are compelled to
determine if there is anything within the Constitution which authorizes
the military trial of dependents accompanying the armed forces
overseas.”).
224. See id. at 20 (“The wives of servicemen are no more members of the
‘land and naval Forces’ when living at a military post in England or
Japan than when living at a base in this country or in Hawaii or
Alaska.”).
225. See id. at 5-6 (holding that “we reject the idea that when the United
States acts against citizens abroad it can do so free of the Bill of
Rights.”).
226. Id. at 5; see also id. at 49 (Frankfurter, J. concurring) (“I therefore
conclude that, in capital cases, the exercise of court martial jurisdiction
over civilian dependents in time of peace cannot be justified by Article
I.”) (emphasis added).
227. Id. at 3 (noting that the “court-martial asserted jurisdiction over Mrs.
Covert under Article 2 (11) of the UCMJ.”)
228. Id. at 22-23. (emphasis added).
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absence of a bright-line definition of de facto soldier leaves open the
possibility that a civilian could fall under military jurisdiction.229
Thus, the court’s explicit failure to articulate when a civilian becomes
a de facto member of the military, combined with the meaningful
roles that contemporary PMCs fill, makes it possible a PMC could be
distinguished from the civilian dependents in Reid.
2.

Active Hostilities: When is a Civilian “in the Field?”

Additionally, it appears well-settled that a PMC could only be
deemed to be in the land and naval forces if their conduct took place
in “the field” of “active hostilities”, during a time of “war.”230
Reid, at length, discussed the fact that the defendant’s conviction
took place during a time of peace.231 While the Court declined to
extend jurisdiction to the defendant, it did note that courts have
“upheld military trial of civilians performing services for the armed
forces “in the field” during time of war.”232 In contrast to the
defendant in Reid, who was living on a military base in the United
Kingdom during a time of peace, PMCs who served in Iraq and other
contingency operations are serving during a time of “war” under the
amended language of the UCMJ.233 Moreover, as many of these PMCs
serve alongside soldiers, including conducting combat operations and
security details, it is arguable a PMC is precisely the type of civilian
referenced in Reid who could permissibly fall under military
jurisdiction.234
In Ali, the Court also discussed the requirement that a civilian be
“in the field” for the military to exercise jurisdiction over the
individual. Describing what is meant by the phrase “in the field”, the
Court explained that:
We see no reason not to adopt [the] interpretation of “in the
field,” which requires an area of actual fighting, for our analysis
of Article 2(a)(10).235

229. See Corn, supra note 104, at 506-507.
230. See Reid, 354 U.S. at 33-34.
231. See id.. at 23-27.
232. Id. at 33; see also McElroy v. United States, 361 U.S. 281, 286 (1959)
(discussing how past convictions of civilians under military law occurred
in times of “hostilities”, while “in the field.”).
233. See generally UCMJ.
234. See Reid, 354 U.S. at 22-23 (discussing “that there might be
circumstances where a person could be ‘in’ the armed services…even
though he had not formally been inducted into the military or did not
wear a uniform.”).
235. United States v. Ali, 71 M.J. 256, 264 (2012).
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The Court further went on to explain the defendant’s connection with
the military, noting that Ali lived at a forward combat outpost, faced
daily attacks from insurgents and took part in missions that required
him to travel by military convoy in armored vehicles.236 Under this
definition of “in the field”, it is certainly arguable many PMCs could
fall under military jurisdiction, as there is ample evidence to suggest
the modern-day PMC is often in close proximity to actual fighting
while they accompany military forces.237 For example, PMCs are
frequently tasked with driving convoys through “high-risk” areas of
war zones, and in there have been numerous cases where the United
State military was forced to conduct rescue missions to recover
disabled PMC vehicles.238
For decades, prior to the amended wording in Article 2(a)(10),
the Court of Military Appeals decision in United States v. Averette
constituted a de facto elimination of extending military jurisdiction
over civilians.239 While the holding in Averette was permissibly
abrogated by the 2007 Amendment, given that Congress was within
its Constitutional-limits to promulgate the laws of the military, it is
still worth briefly examining Averette.240
In Averette, a civilian contractor serving in Vietnam was
convicted of larceny by a court-martial.241 On appeal to the Court of
Military Appeals, however, the defendant’s conviction was overturned,
with the majority holding that Article 2(10), which then read “in time
of war”, only meant a Congressionally declared war.242 Applying this
strict and literal interpretation of the phrase “in time of war”, the
court believed that it was preventing the “possibility of civilian
prosecutions by military courts whenever military action on a varying
scale of intensity.”243
By enacting the 2007 Amendment, Congress legislatively nullified
the Averette holding.244 Assuming arguendo that the 2007 Amendment
did not abrogate the Averette decision, it is arguable that Averette
236. Id.
237. See Lindemann, supra note
interchangeability of uniformed
Blackwater USA personnel).

24,
and

at 84-85 (discussing the
non-uniformed personnel of

238. Id. at 85 (explaining tasks of contractors).
239. Corn, supra note 104, at 499.
240. United States v. Averette, 42 C.M.R. 363, 363 (1970).
241. Id.
242. Id. at 365.
243. Id.
244. See United States v. Ali, 71 M.J. 256, 262 (2012) (stating that
“Congress amended the language of Article 2 in . . . 2007 . . . effectively
nullifying Averette.”).
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itself was incorrectly decided and should not be (or have) been
binding legal authority.
First, the holding in Averette directly contradicted prior Supreme
Court precedent.245 Secondly, Averette ignored well-settled historical
practices, for, as many commentators point out, the absence of a
declaration of war during the Indian Wars during the 19th Century
did not preclude military courts from exercising jurisdiction over
civilian employees.246 Third, as the dissent in Averette noted, the
majority construed the phrase “in time of war” in a manner
inconsistent with how the phrase was applied in other portions of the
UCMJ.247 As one of the major canons of statutory interpretation is to
presume a consistent meaning of usage throughout the entirety of a
statute,248 it is arguable that the Court applied the incorrect meaning
of the phrase “in time of war” given its usage throughout the rest of
the UCMJ. As Congress was acting well within its Constitutional
authority when it amended Article 2(10), however, it is likely that the
Averette holding is moot regardless.
3.

What is a Crime? Military Crimes, Capital Offenses and the PMC

A major criticism of the application of military law to nonmilitary personnel, including PMCs, is the concern that actions that
are criminal under the UCMJ may not have an analogous civilian
crime.249 Because of this, many in support of the extension of military
justice to PMCs have argued that criminal culpability should be
limited to those crimes with a direct civilian analog.250

245. See Peters, supra note 27, at 403 (noting that the holding in Averette
ignored governing precedent, such as Bas v. Tingy, 4 U.S. (4 Dall.) 37,
40 (1800), which indicated a formal declaration of war was not required
for the United States to be at “war”. In Tingy, the Supreme Court of
the United States held that “every contention by force between two
nations, in external matters, under the authority of their respective
governments, is not only war, but public war.”) (emphasis added).
246. Id. at 402; see also Snyder, supra note 26, at 92.
247. See Averette, 42 C.M.R. at 366 (Baker, C.J. dissenting) (noting that in
a previous Court of Military Appeals case, the court had rejected a
petitioner’s contention that court-martial jurisdiction pursuant to
Article 2(10) depended on a Congressional declaration of war, in part
because the phrase “in time of war”, as used in Articles 43 and 85(c) of
the UCMJ, did not comport with that interpretation of the phrase).
248. See Ratzlaf v. United States, 510 U.S. 135, 143 (1994) (stating the
precedent that “[a] term appearing in several places in a statutory text
is generally read the same way each time it appears.”).
249. Singer, supra note 44.
250. See e.g. Chapman, supra note 12, at 1078-1079 (arguing that
prosecution of PMCs for criminal conduct should be limited to crimes
with civilian equivalents); see also Singer, supra note 44 (contending
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In the estimation of this Note, however, such limitation would be
the incorrect approach. As discussed previously, the overriding
purpose of the creation of a military justice system is to ensure
discipline amongst military forces. Vis-a-vis their conduct PMCs are
essentially soldiers in all but name; it would stand to reason that they
should be held to the same rigid disciplinary standards as actual
military personnel. If PMCs were to be absolved of such
responsibility, commanders, who fill the central role in court-martial
proceedings, would be severely limited in their ability to hold PMCs
accountable for criminal conduct. In turn, this would defeat the
purposes of subjecting PMCs to military jurisdiction, namely:
ensuring personal justice for injured parties and preventing harm to
military objectives caused by the lack of discipline and misconduct of
PMCs.
Moreover, in at least one case, the Supreme Court has held that
charging civilians with a military crime was permissible.251 In Reed,
the defendant was charged and convicted by court-martial for the
military crime of “malfeasance in the discharge of his official
duties.”252 Vitally, the Court held that Reed was sufficiently
integrated with the military to constitute a de facto soldier, making
military crimes applicable to Reed.253 Accordingly, military crimes
with no civilian analogs may be appropriate for PMCs, as PMCs
could be reasonably be determined to be “in” the “land and naval
forces”, and thus beholden to all laws of the military.
The more controversial consideration is charging PMCs with
capital crimes. In both Reid and Grisham v. Hagan, the Supreme
Court appears to have expressly forbidden charging civilians with
capital offense.254 It is important to note, however, that both of these
cases involved civilians who were not deemed in be “in” the military,
and were merely dependents or civilian employees.255 Moreover, both
of these cases involved crimes that were committed during times of
that PMCs should only be held liable under the UCMJ for crimes that
would be felonies had they occurred in the United States).
251. Ex parte Reed, 100 U.S. 13, 19-23 (1879).
252. Id. at 20
253. See generally id. at 22 (holding that Reed is a member of the naval
service as a paymaster’s clerk and as such, is under the jurisdiction of a
naval court).
254. See generally id. at 21 (explaining jurisdictional questions with respect
to capital offenses); see also Grisham v. Hagan, 361 U.S. 278, 280 (“the
death penalty is so irreversible that a dependent . . . must have the
benefit of a jury.”).
255. See generally id. at 21-22 (explaining Reed’s position and its importance
in the military); See also Grisham, 361 U.S. at 279 (explaining the
petitioner’s civilian status).
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peace, far away from the “field” or any active hostilities.256 Although
it is unclear how a court would rule on the matter involving a civilian,
imposition of the death penalty is permissible under military law.257
Consequently, provided a PMC was deemed “in” the “land and naval
forces” and the crime occurred during a time of war, it is arguable a
PMC could be charged with a capital offense.
Thus, in light of the above mentioned reasoning, this Note urges
the application of the following crimes to PMCs under military
jurisdiction: First, PMCs could potentially be charged with capital
offenses under the 2007 Amendment, as it is arguable that the Reid
and Grisham’s holdings, forbidding convictions for capital offenses,
are limited to times of peace and cases involving civilians with an
unsubstantial connection to the military. Secondly, PMCs could be
charged with any non-capital offense, whether it has a civilian
equivalent. While this may lead to unsavory circumstances where a
PMC is charged with a crime that does not exist in the civilian world,
given the discipline rationales giving rise to military justice, failing to
charge PMCs with these offenses could potentially lead to sharp
declines in military effectiveness.

VI. Conclusion
As the use of PMCs as soldier-like replacements for actual
military personnel appears likely to continue, it stands to reason that
events such as Nisour Square and the Triple Canopy shooting will
reoccur. When such events occur they will invariably cause backlash
against the United States military, hampering its efforts and
objective. As such, it is imperative that PMC conduct be reined in
and PMC held accountable when they commit crimes.
The 2007 Amendment, extending military jurisdiction over PMCs,
represents the best mechanism for ensuring PMC accountability. The
military justice system exists to punish the very misconduct engaged
in by PMCs; moreover, there is nothing in the Constitution that
forbids the extension of military justice to civilians, provided certain
circumstances exist. Although critics may claim that such extension
would violate PMCs constitutional rights, it is well-settled that the
Constitution applies differently in the military justice context.
Accordingly, when an individual finds themselves under the
256. See id. at 19-20 (case in which petitioner was charged with malfeasance
while stationed in South America, but not during wartime); see also
Grisham, 361 U.S. at 310 (case in which petitioner was charged with
premeditated murder while working as a civilian employee of the Army,
but not during active hostilities).
257. Clark Smith, Fair and Impartial? Military Jurisdiction and the Decision
to Seek the Death Penalty, 5 U. MIAMI NAT’L SECURITY & ARMED
CONFLICT L. REV. 1, 6-8 (2015).
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jurisdiction of the military justice system, their Constitutional rights
are not the same as they would receive in the civilian realm.
As this Note has argued, PMCs undoubtedly fail within the
narrow exception of civilians to whom the UCMJ could
Constitutionally apply too. PMCs engage in activity that few would
hesitate to consider soldier-like; to wit, most “civilians” do not
operate missile batteries on a daily basis as some PMCs do. Moreover,
PMCs are frequently in the thick of active hostilities and often serve
next to actual soldiers fighting “the field.” Consequently, PMCs are
sufficiently integrated into the military so as to fall under its laws,
and thus, the 2007 Amendment, as it applies to PMCs should (and
can) survive Constitutional scrutiny.
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